FROM MANDATE TO MOTIVATION: INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN DIGITAL INFRASTRUCTURE GOVERNANCE

Abstract

Digital infrastructure is often treated as a technical investment problem, although implementation depends equally on sustained cooperation among agencies, districts, project teams, and operators. This paper develops a conceptual explanation for uneven implementation in capable cities. It combines Hurwicz's incentive-compatibility approach with Herzberg's distinction between motivators and hygiene factors. The resulting framework separates four incentive functions—mission-based, administrative-advancement, economic, and career-development incentives—from two sets of conditions: official traits and project location. It also defines an incentive gap between formally announced rewards and the strength perceived by implementing actors. Three mechanisms enlarge that gap: implementation lag, criterion ambiguity, and attribution ambiguity. Nanjing's digital transportation transformation is used as an illustrative case, not as an empirical test. The analysis shows why data sharing, long project horizons, and citywide spillovers can weaken otherwise credible mandates. Six propositions specify when incentive portfolios should motivate cooperation and when they may instead encourage symbolic compliance, project selection, or competition for credit. The framework implies that effective design requires shared contribution records, project-specific evaluation, differentiated incentive portfolios, and shorter feedback cycles.