THE IMPACT OF LABOR DISPATCH EMPLOYMENT ON BANK PERFORMANCE: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS, MECHANISMS, AND AN EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION FRAMEWORK
Keywords:
Labor dispatch, Bank performance, Employment flexibility, Operational risk, Equal pay for equal work, Risk-adjusted returnsAbstract
Labor dispatch employment is a staffing form widely discussed in the banking sector under pressure from branch transformation, cost control, and flexible service provision, but its impact on bank performance is not unidirectional. Based on human capital architecture theory, transaction cost theory, organizational flexibility theory, psychological contract theory, and operational risk theory, and integrating the characteristics of the banking industry—knowledge intensity, reputation sensitivity, strong regulation, and risk contagion—this paper constructs a fourfold mechanism of "cost flexibility—service efficiency—risk compliance—human capital stability." This paper proposes that the relationship between the proportion of labor dispatch employment and banks' risk-adjusted performance may follow an inverted U-shape: moderate use can reduce rigid employment costs and enhance numerical flexibility and efficiency in auxiliary positions, whereas excessive use harms performance through coordination and supervision costs, compliance costs, operational risk, and declining service quality; job criticality, regulatory intensity, equal pay for equal work enforcement, and digitalization level constitute important moderating variables. In terms of research design, this paper recommends bank-year panel fixed effects models, instrumental variable methods, propensity score matching, and a difference-in-differences identification strategy using the Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch as a shock, with employee stability, service continuity, operational risk, and compliance costs as mediating channels. This paper does not report fabricated data or empirical results, but instead provides testable propositions, a variable system, and a causal identification framework, offering a theoretical basis for optimizing bank employment strategies and differentiated regulation.References
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