THE ECONOMICS OF IP ASSET DEPLETION IN CROSS IP COLLABORATION

Abstract

Cross-IP collaboration has become a regular commercial strategy in character merchandise, entertainment, games, fashion and collectible markets. Firms combine independently controlled intellectual properties to create new products, events and consumption settings. This paper studies a specific economic problem within this practice: a firm may rationally expand cross-IP collaboration even when repeated collaboration places pressure on the long-term value of the focal IP. Drawing on brand equity, brand extension, co-branding fit and brand dilution research, the paper develops an exogenous parameter model in which a firm chooses collaboration intensity by comparing short-term collaboration benefit, development cost and long-term IP asset depletion loss. The model derives the equilibrium condition for development intensity and shows how weak internalization of long-term asset loss can move a firm above a sustainable collaboration boundary. The paper then translates the model into an operational scoring framework using public indicators, including secondary-market premium, release-window attention, product-count intensity, price volatility, background attention decline and focal-IP revenue concentration. The weights in this framework are introduced as exogenous diagnostic parameters, with their economic meaning and normalization rules stated explicitly. Pop Mart cross-IP products are used as an exploratory case setting. The case evidence suggests that cross-IP collaboration can generate visible market value and asset pressure at the same time. The paper contributes a definition of IP asset depletion, a tractable theoretical model and a replicable public-data pathway for future empirical research.